Recent research has argued that urban policy has turned towards entrepreneurial forms of urban governance, resulting in a more fragmented and decentralized setting within which public policy is formulated and implemented. This implies that the context for public sector urban planning is also influenced by this "turn". This paper questions this "turn" by arguing that, in Sweden and in practice, forms of fragmentation and decentralization coexist with remnants of coherence and centralization. It focuses on two planning projects, one in Malmö and one in Lund. A case study approach is followed, using official documentation and expert interviews. The paper indicates that public authorities and planners remain crucial in urban development projects as initiators of projects, when they bring in financial incentives or lease out the plots for development, or when they add to the project's political legitimacy and bring to the table different actors that would otherwise be less likely to join forces. It concludes by discussing how public sector urban planning is adjusting to the changes brought forward by entrepreneurial urban governance. The paper contributes to the literature on how urban planning is adapting to changes in the context for urban governance. 
Introduction
The term "Entrepreneurial Urban Governance" was first coined to describe urban policies pursued within a context of neoliberalization of urban policy in the US and the UK, following the critique and dismissal of the Keynesian Welfare State (Cochrane, 2007) . It is not related to a decline in the role of public authorities in urban policy, nor to a simple replacement of the role of the public by the private sector. Instead, what is pointed out is a change in how the public and private sectors interact within urban development projects and policies, particularly within a context of inter-urban competition (Shimomura & Matsumoto, 2010; Jessop, 1998) .
The city is "entrepreneurial" because the actors involved in urban policy adopt business-like approaches, such as branding, marketing, speculation and risk-taking, to urban policy-making. This approach is considered to represent a "shift" or a "turn" (Harvey, 1989; Swyngedouw, 2005; Cochrane, 2007) , whereby local governments are steering away from traditional activities linked with the local provision on welfare and services, and adopting a more proactive and outwardoriented approach to promote local economic development, a "strategic growth policy" (Andersen & Pløger, 2007) . This turn is characterized by risk-taking, inventiveness, promotionseeking, and profit motivation as guiding local policy-making (Hall & Hubbard, 1998; Dannestam, 2009 ). The city is developed as a brand and a product that can serve as a setting for creative and innovative companies to invest in; for new inhabitants, especially those who are highly skilled and educated, to reside in; and for private investors to invest in real estate or to create new businesses. Policy makers are managers looking for new business opportunities, ways of promoting their own product, and new business partners willing to invest in and develop the product. Entrepreneurial urban governance also results from the adoption of discursive practices that promote an entrepreneurial-oriented position by a wide range of social actors, from policy makers and private investors, to workers and ordinary citizens (Painter, 1998; Jessop, 1998; Hubbard, 1996; Brenner & Theodore 2002a and b; Smith 2002) .
Much has been written about the implications of this turn towards entrepreneurial forms of urban governance for urban policy making (Hall & Hubbard, 1998; Cochrane, 2007; Healey, 2006) and the public sector (Montin, 2000; Elander & Strömberg, 2001; Swyngedouw et. al. 2002 , Hohn & Neuer, 2006 MacCleod, 2011) . However, the strong emphasis of these strategies on interventions over the physical landscape of a city or neighborhood implies greater attention to what is being done by public sector urban planning, as the field that formally takes charge over urban planning in the city. There are fewer studies focusing on this issue (although see McGuirk & MacLaran, 2001; Gualini & Major, 2007; Tasan-Kok, 2010; Therkildsen, Hansen & Lorentzen, 2009) . Existing studies tend to approach this turn by emphasizing that it signifies a decrease in the scope of influence for public sector, and by extension for urban planning (McGuirk & MacLaran, 2001 , Elander & Strömberg, 2001 ).
Additionally, in scholarly literature, what characterizes this "turn" has been influenced by the Anglo-Saxon context in which it was firstly discussed (Harvey, 1989; Leitner, 1990; Hubbard & Hall, 1998) , often associated with broader discussions on the neoliberal influences over urban policy (Brenner & Theodore, 2002a; Macleod, 2011 , McGuirk, 2012 and the transformations of urban policy and governance in the context of the rescaling of the State (Brenner, 2004) . But as previous studies have argued, the extent to which this turn has been replicated in other contexts is debatable (Andersen & Pløger, 2007; McGuirk, 2012) . This paper questions this "turn" towards entrepreneurial urban governance by looking into two large-scale urban development projects (LSUDPs) in Sweden. The paper asks how this turn might influence the context in which physical planning occurs. A second question is how physical planning is adapting to it.
Research design
Sweden presents a suitable example to question the thesis of a "turn" in urban policy turn towards entrepreneurial urban governance, because it presents a context that can be understood as opposite to the Anglo-Saxon tradition, essentially built up since the Thatcher years. The Anglo-Saxon tradition involved municipalities that had little influencing powers in the formulation of visions and in the implementation of urban development strategies, in relation to the importance of the private sector and of urban development corporations. It is also characterized by municipalities with little economic resources to actually drive urban development or legal rights to do so (Lind, 2000) .
In Sweden urban planning has been conducted within a strong municipal planning monopoly, build up during the 20th century (Blucher, 2006) . The bulk of the planning tasks are found at the local level. The emphasis is on the formulation of plans that contribute to the management of physical resources -land, water, buildings -with the intention of protecting or caring for the social, cultural and economic spheres. In this paper the concept of physical planning will be used to indicate municipal urban planning and the local planning department in Sweden.
Back in the 1970s, municipalities were responsible for formulating visions for how the city should develop; they had a strong legal position in terms of expropriation of land and of its use, and it was not possible to appeal municipal decision other than those resulting from formal errors in processing. Additionally, the municipality was the dominant landowner, granting it a strong negotiative and decision-making position in the housing market, and it owned building companies and housing associations. Finally, on the national level, the government regulated credit and gave generous terms for the financing of municipal housing companies, shielding them from market fluctuations (Lind, 2000; Blucher, 2006) .
However, since the 1990s the national level's housing policy has essentially disappeared (Blucher, 2006) , impacting the municipal housing associations, which were suddenly forced to operate without the shield of the financial subsidies and regulated credits, which opened them up to market fluctuations (Hedman, 2008 ). Additionally, the national level has granted more discretionary powers to the municipalities, empowering them to make their own decisions regarding what to do with their housing market and their urban development strategies. But it has simultaneously withdrawn many of the state subsidies to municipal housing companies. This pushed municipalities to engage in more frequent partnerships with the private sector in urban development projects (Blucher, 2006; Hedman, 2008; Elander & Strömberg, 2001) . It must be noted that even during the 1970s, municipalities were working in coalition with the private sector in the pursuit of urban development projects, often in rather stable partnerships with a small handful of private actors that were ideologically aligned with the local politicians (Elander & Strömberg, 2001 ). Nevertheless, recent research has revealed a change in how urban policy is conducted, with municipal discourses and urban development projects aligning with the entrepreneurial urban governance literature (Dannestam, 2009; Mukhtar-Landgren, 2012 ).
The cases were chosen because of their potential to illustrate a potential "turn" in urban policy towards entrepreneurial urban governance and how this "turn" might influence the practices of physical planning. The cases offer a context that might favor the emergence of entrepreneurial forms of urban governance, a context where conflicts and contradictions in the practice of physical planning might be brought to light.
The Bo01 is the site of an international housing exhibition held in Malmö in 2001. The old harbor area was converted into an exhibition stage in a case of urban renewal being used to create a new image for the city -from industrial city in decline to "knowledge city." Nowadays, the area includes residential and office spaces, public parks and recreational areas, and hosts a new media and IT-focused university and several knowledge-intensive companies.
Brunnshög is an urban expansion project currently under way in Lund. The location of the National Electron Accelerator Laboratory for Synchrotron Radiation Research (MaxIV) and of a European Spallation Source (ESS) facility in the area gave the impetus for the municipality and developers to turn their attention to Brunnshög. The aim is to create a new district for the city that attracts new companies and investments and contributes to the sharing of ideas between the professionals who will work and reside in the area.
In both cases, events external to the municipality -a housing exhibition and the establishment of research facilities -are the engine behind the area transformation. Urban development is being used to create a district of the city where knowledge-intensive companies, entrepreneurial activity, and the "creative classes" (Florida, 2002) are key goals.
The paper is informed by a series of expert interviews and analysis of documentary evidence, plans and reports, which were used to build a review of the urban governance structure built around the projects and what tasks, responsibilities and challenges physical planning faced within these projects.
The following section introduces the main characteristics of an entrepreneurial "turn" in urban governance and what this might imply for the practice of physical planning. The subsequent section outlines and analyzes the cases in light of the turn discussed in the literature. The conclusion emphasizes that in Sweden, although the influence of physical planning might appear to be watered down with the involvement of so many stakeholders in the project, in practice public authorities remain influential actors in urban development projects as initiators of the projects, either when they bring in financial incentives or lease out plots for development, or when they add political legitimacy and bring to the table different actors that would otherwise be less likely to join forces in the project. The paper illustrates a process of adaption of physical planning practices to changes and challenges in a context marked by elements of a turn to entrepreneurial urban governance.
Entrepreneurial Urban Governance in physical planning
Entrepreneurial approaches to urban policy are frequently portrayed as representing a turn "from government to governance" (Harvey, 1989; Hall & Hubbard, 1998) , meaning that in Western countries, especially after WW2, policy-making and implementation were done by strong publicly elected bodies, while nowadays governance structures bring both public and private actors to the field of urban policy.
Governance is understood here as inter-organizational networks (Rhodes, 1997) , where a wide range of actors from the private, non-profit and public sectors come together to participate in the development and implementation of a project. This network of actors creates the capacity to act by pulling together resources towards a commonly defined goal (Hill & Hupe, 2002) . These resources can also include the definition of framework conditions and ordered rules for collective action, and they focus on governing mechanisms such as grants, contracts and agreements that do not rest solely on government authority and sanctions (Milward & Provan, 1999) .
In a context of urban governance, Harvey understands that nowadays decisions about interventions over different spheres of the city are made in a multi-actor context. For Harvey, "urban government" is not the appropriate expression to classify the processes surrounding the management of the urban area and the relations between the actors involved in this management. Instead, "urban governance" is a more suitable expression, since "the real power to reorganize urban life so often lies elsewhere [not within the 'urban government'], or at least within a broader coalition of forces within which urban government and administration have only a facilitative and coordinating role to play" (Harvey, 1989: 6) .
Healey theorizes governance as forms of collective action that create the capacity to act within the public realm (2006) . The territory is what brings the different actors together into a collective. Governance structures are materialized by these constellations of actors through rules, norms, material resources and framing ideas that are mobilized and created for the temporary setting of a governance structure within a particular project. For physical planning, this interpretation of governance allows a distinction between structures that enable or hinder the action of the governance actors (public officials and politicians, investors, NGOs, city inhabitants, and other members of the collective). The governance structure which develops is not stable or enduring. On the contrary, it is always changing according to the actors involved and as those actors develop the structure in order to work together towards a defined goal. The governance structure is a "social process" of capacity building (Healey, 2006) . As such, governance implies temporality. This contributes to the fragmentation, uncertainty and complexity of the arenas for physical planning action, and is derived from the multi-actor context and fleeting character of the publicprivate partnerships established in urban development projects. Figure 1 emphasizes the main characteristics of the "turn" in urban policy with potential influence over physical planning. In this paper the "turn" is understood as characterized by fragmentation (piece-meal approaches to urban development, geographical dispersion of projects, influence of private sector approaches, and temporary partnerships) and decentralization (partnerships with stakeholders from private and public sectors, decentralized forms of urban governance, and replacement of established hierarchies by looser networks). 
From Centralization towards Decentralization
The turn from government to governance is discussed by scholars as developing in the decentralization in public administration and government (Montin, 2000) and resulting from an ideological (Jessop, 2002; McGuirk, 2012) or opportunistic (Swyngedouw et al. 2002) turn in policy-making towards neoliberalism (Harvey, 2005) . For Khakee and Barbanente this governance approach is characterized as a turn "from unidirectional, hierarchical control to control through networks [where local politics,] to a larger extent than previously, tries to create premises for development by attempting to coordinate various resources" (Khakee & Barbanente, 2003: 185) A turn towards more decentralized forms of urban governance can be seen in the delegation of tasks and decision-making power from the state to the local level, and in the decentralization of some municipal tasks, namely welfare services provision, to public actors at lower political levels (Montin, 2000) . In Sweden, decentralization trends have influenced the enactment of discretionary laws, namely the Planning and Building Act of 1987, by which the state defines broad guidelines for how municipalities are to act within a specific policy field, which is deemed to be best addressed at the local level (Montin & Elander, 1995) . Decentralization might come from trends that view dialogue, cooperation and networks as more effective ways of implementing local-based policies, and as a response to critiques that top-down regulatory approaches make it more difficult for urban development to respond to rapid social, technological and economic changes (Tasan-Kok, 2010) . It might also just be an illustration of previous trends whereby it was the local level that effectively had control over a specific policy field, and decentralization by the state is merely recognition of a loss of power that it never held (Montin & Elander, 1995) .
Partnerships that include both public and private stakeholders emerge as the organizational element behind the decision-making and implementation of urban development projects (Therkildsen, Hansen & Lorentzen, 2009; Tasan-Kok, 2010; Shimomura & Matsumoto, 2010) . The actors involved in these partnerships add to the project their particular inputs in terms of objectives, demands, preconditions, ways of working and funding. This results in a greater complexity of levels of intervention, players, funding sources, goals and accountability that contributes to the increased fragmentation in urban governance within an urban development project.
In Sweden the implementation of the post-war Welfare State was largely at the hands of local coalitions between the Social Democratic state and local politicians and businesses with strong affiliation to the party and linked to the housing sector (Elander & Strömberg, 2001; Blucher, 2006; Hedman, 2008) . Thus partnerships are not a new element per se in the Swedish context. However, two substantial changes have occurred from the 1970s context: the state level has decentralized some of the decision-making power to the local level, and it has simultaneously cut back on the state resources to implement many of the tasks traditionally allocated to municipalities. The abandonment of the housing policy translated at the local level into a push towards opening up the local housing sector to the influences of market forces and private interests (Khakee, 2005; Blucher, 2006; Hedman, 2008) . One can point to this as evidence of a turn from a governance setting marked by rigid hierarchies (in which the state level providing a comprehensive regulatory framework where the implementation rested in the hands of local politicians and small number of business interests) towards a governance setting marked by looser networks (with less clear and stable partnerships forming according to the project at hand). The "real power to reorganize urban life" (Harvey, 1989: 6) shifts according to the networks formed.
From Coherence towards Fragmentation
Policy-making and implementation under an entrepreneurial approach arguably took a turn towards focusing primarily on single projects. Swyngedouw et al. (2002) discussed the turn from a comprehensive approach to planning (which they called "the plan") to an approach more constrained by time, space and resources (which they called "the project"). These projects developed a segment of the city in view of the socioeconomic and political objectives of the multi-actors governance structure that was created around the project. Often poorly integrated within the wider urban processes of the city and its planning system, these types of projects are characterized as one-off ventures decoupled from their context and from the planning projects of the wider municipality -a piecemeal approach to urban development. Additionally, the urban development projects tend to be more scattered across space -greater geographical dispersion of the location of the projects.
One could also see this turn to projects and a piecemeal approach as an unavoidable consequence of the growing importance of public-private partnerships and negotiative planning (Cars, 1992; Khakee & Barbanente, 2003) , illustrating the close cooperation between public and private actors in order to reach an agreement that will best suit the interests of those involved in the partnership. A project-based approach could be more easily tuned to comply with the interests of the stakeholders involved and to deal with the necessary time and financial constraints imposed. Additionally, it allowed physical planning to develop through several individual projects with inter-project coordination developing through a series of adjustments and agreements between various actors (Khakee & Barbanente, 2003) .
The challenge is how to create integration within this fragmented landscape of projects, actors, goals and sources of funding. One could also argue that the strength of the current landscape of urban projects lies exactly in the fragmented character of the coalitions of actors behind these projects. A fragmented and temporary set of actors cooperating within a project opens up possibilities for learning and exchange of knowledge and experiences to occur across interest groups that might not, in other situations, meet and cooperate (Grabher, 1993) . Fragmentation can be interpreted as an opportunity to create and integrate diversity into the governance setting of a project. This fragmented style of governance is also supportive of a growing attention to the characteristics of place, as territory is the common denominator underlying these partnerships (Healey, 2006) .
Challenges for physical planning
In recent years, scholars have focused on challenges for physical planning practice derived from this entrepreneurial approach. Tasan-Kok (2010) highlights that in a multi-actor context, there are conflicting interests and competing aims coinciding in the project, not necessarily limited to differences between public and private actors' objectives, but also between different private actors. There are also limitations posed by the persistence of hierarchical relations that hinder the emergence of plural forms of leadership, coordinated action and quick responses. Simultaneously, area-based agencies are set up to oversee the projects, replacing or shadowing traditional tasks of the planning department (Tasan-Kok, 2010; McGuirk & MacLaran, 2001 ).
There is a general lack of overview of how the project fits or is complemented by other projects happening throughout the city (Swyngedow et al 2002) . As McGuirk and MacLaran state, "because the greater part of the development activity is led by the private sector and remains dependent on its profitability criteria, such a reliance inevitably emphasizes the imperative of maintaining a corporate ethos and adopting modes of planning practice which continue to be appropriately supportive of property capital" (McGuirk & MacLaran, 2001: 439) This also explains why aims and goals change according to market conditions.
Physical planning is faced with the dilemma of working with the tools and representatives of the private sector in public-private teams that do not necessarily have in mind the needs of the city's inhabitants and are instead focused on specific project goals (Campbell & Fainstein, 2003; Burkitt & Whyman, 1994; Andersen & Pløger, 2007) . Montin (2000) points out that traditional local planning used to be responsible for regulating land use, while nowadays its role is focused on providing the means for development opportunities. Physical planning has been transformed from a regulator into an enabler of pro-growth strategies. The planner not only plans for the location of housing and workplaces, but also for an image that attracts specific types of inhabitants and companies. Introduction
The Bo01 was an international housing exhibition with the motto of "City of Tomorrow". The exhibition was held in Western Harbor (Figure 2 ), a former industrial area, scarred by the presence of shipyards which went bankrupt in 1987 and a SAAB industrial complex which was shut down in 1991. To host an international exhibition in a location where the industrial tradition of the city was the most visible served the dual purpose of renovating an abandoned area and building a new image of the city, one associated with innovation, creativity and sustainability, to replace the traditional image of a blue-collar city hit by unemployment and industrial decline.
Parallel to this project, the city center was being renovated and a new university college had been established, also in Western Harbor. The Öresund Bridge opened in 2000, representing the physical connection between southwest Sweden and mainland Europe, and there were plans to build a city tunnel that would further strengthen the role of Malmö as a regional center and extend its commuting area. Three of Bo01's overarching goals -sustainable living, strengthening the image of Malmö as a place to live and invest in, and the redevelopment of a new district of the city -were supported by parallel projects throughout the city. Brunnshög is located in the northeast of Lund in an area that has been targeted for expansion since the Comprehensive Plan of 1991. It is bordered by the neighborhood that hosts Ericsson, highway E22 and the area where the labs MaxIV and ESS will be built in the near future. To the east there is a large park, and to the south, the residential neighborhood of Östra Torn. Location is a fundamental problem with urban development in Brunnshög as it is physically cut off from the city by the E22, the IDEON Science Park and Lund's Faculty of Engineering (LTH) ( Figure  3 ). The idea to expand the city towards the northeast has existed since the mid-1990s, and plots had already been allocated to larger developers (Interview Dalman). However, the disadvantage of being "first movers" into an area that is not particularly attractive for investment had detracted from the interest of developers (Interview Flycht). There was also the lack of clear political vision of what this area would become. It took the decision to locate ESS and MaxIV in the area to restart the process. Suddenly the project regained political importance: "The whole world will have some expectations about Lund and nothing is happening in Brunnshög. So we have to make sure that we have something there" (Interview Dalman).
Other planned projects directly support the goal of creating a lively and attractive district in Brunnshög. A tram connection (Lundalänken) is under discussion and is considered an important element for the image of urbanity to be created in the district (Interviews Dalman, Flycht). An energy proposal is being developed by Lunds Energy in partnership with the municipality, ESS, MaxIV and VaSyd to capture the heat produced by research facilities and use it as district heating for the city, thus contributing to the sustainability emphasis of the project. Brunnshög is included within the "Road of Science", an initiative to brand a corridor that comprises the university area, IDEON, the university-hospital, Brunnshög, ESS and MaxIV as a knowledge-intensive area. The university and IDEON are also discussing the possibility of adding more diversity of uses to the area now occupied by LTH and IDEON. The rehabilitation of the central station area, including the connection with Lundalänken, is also planned (Interviews Dalman, Flycht). Table 1 illustrates the governance structure of each project, highlighting the position of the planning department.
Governance as collective action
In both cases the municipality and the developers are the main stakeholders, even though there are important inputs to the projects from other stakeholders, such as LTH and different energy agencies -Sydkraft, Lunds Energy, Vad Syd. In the case of Bo01, the housing exhibition organization (SVEBO) was an important stakeholder in decisions regarding the organization of the exhibition itself, but this ended up resulting in a lasting influence over the design of the area for the future. An important difference between the two projects is that in the case of Bo01, the Municipal Departments of City Planning, Real Estates and Parks and Streets were jointly responsible for the project. In the case of Brunnshög, a separate project group was put together with one single project leader. Regarding the responsibility of the planning department, of notable import is its bridging role between the different stakeholders, parallel to its customary task of developing the area plans. 
Between Coherence and Fragmentation
Fragmentation, as discussed earlier, was a result of the public-private partnerships that brought a wider variety of funding sources, of actors putting claims on the project, and of ways of working (Khakee & Barbanente, 2003; Swyngedouw et. al. 2002) , with the municipality striving to coordinate various resources (Khakee & Barbanente, 2003; Tasan-Kok, 2010 ).
In the case of Brunnshög and Bo01, public-private partnerships are also the norm, and inevitably there were conflicting and even antagonist perspectives on how the two districts should develop. The most frequently mentioned example of planners opposing developers was traffic and limits to parking. In both projects, physical planning held a key position at the negotiation table by inviting other stakeholders to join in the processes early on in order to have time to build a common approach and aim for the neighborhood. It also tried to ensure that the aims of the individual project remained coherent with the visions for the city and other planning projects happening in parallel (Interviews Reepalu, Dalman).
One such example of how physical planning tried to build a common platform of understanding between the different stakeholders was the elaboration of the Quality Program for the Bo01, which set the environmental standards for the area. The task was the responsibility of the municipal planning department, but they invited the developers and the exhibition's main architect to participate in the process (Persson, 2005) .
From the physical planning perspective, one cannot claim that there is a turn from comprehensive plans towards fragmented projects (Swyngedouw et. al. 2002; Khakee & Barbanente, 2003) . In the case of Bo01, the project did diverge from the standard process of physical planning (interviews Johansson and Blucher), but this was related to the specific time constraints and to the demands of a housing exhibition. Additionally, many of the environmental standards pioneered with Bo01 and the procedures developed for it were later extended to other planning projects in Malmö (Interviews Johansson, Andersson). The Bo01 project was fully in line with the vision of the municipality to build a new image for Malmö (Interviews Johansson, Blucher).
In the case of Brunnshög, the project is getting renewed attention at a time when other projects are developing across the city with similar goals. "So many things coincide. Regarding the project location, both projects worked to shape a connection with the rest of the city. Bo01 grew in a high scenic value area with branding potential. "[This area] is connected with the green and beach areas and the housing area to [the south] which was also seen as a higher status area. The Bo01 was to become part of this corridor" (Interview Johansson); "The use of small plots and many developers introduced diversity and small scale to the neighborhood, in order to give an image of a more central urban neighborhood" (Interview Reepalu). In the case of Brunnshög, the connection to the city center is being shaped by the urban design of the area, which introduces an urban structure that resembles the medieval pattern of the city center. Also emphasized is Lundalänken in an attempt to overcome the idea that Brunnshög is far from the center.
Regarding the approaches to projects, the influence of the private sector is poorly seen during the planning processes due to the slow housing market situation, which led the developers to assume a reserved position. For Bo01, the municipality had to convince developers to participate by extending favorable lease contracts for the municipally owned land (Interview Reepalu). In the case of Brunnshög, developers are still hesitant to engage in the process because it is not yet clear whether Lundalänken will be built and which plots will be assigned to which developer. Also, the area does not have the same initial potential as Bo01 (Interview Flycht).
Additionally, the use of small plots and a wide variety of architects and developers was an idea originating, in the case of Bo01, from the Bo01AB architect and the municipality, and in the case of Brunnshög, from the municipality. Developers usually work with larger plots and with one developer per plot (Interviews Johansson, Blucher) . This approach was thus in both cases municipally-driven, made possible by the specific demands of the Bo01 housing exhibitionexperimenting with new ways of creating a sustainable urban area -and with the demands of Brunnshög -bridging the character of isolation and distance from the center and creating an environment where people meet and interact. These approaches have been difficult to replicate in other projects (Interview Johansson). The singularity of some of the approaches pioneered in these projects enforces the idea of a piecemeal approach to the planning projects, but not of a private actor influence over how planning is conducted.
The vocabulary used by physical planning to discuss the approaches followed during the project often derives from the business and private sectors: "Bo01 also helped to create quite an innovative "toolkit" for development and planning. This toolkit was based on the quality programme, which endeavored to employ a holistic approach but also gave criteria, detailed objectives and directions for more sustainable solutions, e.g. concerning energy efficiency, source separation of waste, greenery and biodiversity, but also for the more elusive quality of human sustainability" (Persson, 2005:20 , emphasis added).
Between Centralization and Decentralization
One of the characteristics of decentralization pointed out in the literature is the delegation of tasks and decision-making powers from the state towards the local level (Montin, 2000; Montin & Elander, 1995) . In the case of the two LSUDPs this phenomenon is not observable since the municipalities have had a planning monopoly since 1907 (Blucher, 2006) . However, in the process of delegating responsibilities to the local level and of extending public-private partnerships, some authors note the emergence of area-based agencies replacing or overshadowing physical planning (McGuirk & MacLaran, 2001 ). This is observable in the case of Bo01 with the creation of the Bo01AB, which allowed informal procedures and networks to be developed parallel to the action of the planning department. It was an organization focused on the exhibition area, where different actors came together to define what was best for the exhibition, but where the city officials also had a voice. The agency was not formally responsible for the planning of the neighborhood, as formal licenses were the responsibility of the planning department (Interview Reepalu). However, Bo01AB acted as an influential consultant -its main architect designed the layout of the neighborhood, discussed the public spaces with municipal officials, was consulted for the Quality Program, chose the architects and building projects. Thus, although legally the planning tasks were performed by the municipality, informally the frequent meetings with the agency and the coincidence of the demands of the exhibition with the needs of urban development made the agency an influential actor in the planning process (Interviews Blucher, Reepalu).
In both cases the municipality was also the one taking the initiative for projects and for inviting other stakeholders to participate. Therefore, one cannot talk about a turn from a top-down process towards a bottom-up, as the municipal planning monopoly is still maintained. However, the municipality required the active involvement of other public and private stakeholders in order to push forward the project (Table 1) . Especially in the case of Brunnshög, the reticence of developers to engage in the project has contributed to the delays in its execution, highlighting the significance of establishing working networks/ partnerships that will create the capacity to act.
Nevertheless, the decentralization of responsibilities to area-based agencies such as Bo01AB and to developers to ensure compliance in implementing environmental standards, the financing limitations imposed by the State, and the coexistence of multiple sources of funding within the same project (Table 1 ) result in an increasingly complex setting within which physical planning operates. Physical planning remains in the leading role as the tasks of mediating, facilitating and coordinating between the multi-faceted actors of the partnership become increasingly important.
Reactions to the projects' challenges
The context in which these LSUDPs happen provides physical planning with a degree of freedom of experimentation. In the case of Bo01, planners could experiment with a different process of involvement with stakeholders that joined in the negotiations at a much earlier state. It was also possible to push forward environmental standards and regulations, as well as urban design proposals, that would not otherwise be accepted by developers. The context of a housing exhibition, time constraints and the existence of a specific exhibition theme made way for experimenting with ideas and practices. In the case of Brunnshög, the international attention and willingness to show something daring and new are allowing the group of planners involved to also be more daring and creative in their proposals for urban design and for how to involve citizens and other stakeholders. This unusual setting also means there are no fixed practices, and instead the group of stakeholders is exploring new ways of acting together as they go along (Interviews Blucher, Johansson, Larsson, Dalman) .
The interviewees were asked about how the stakeholders had reacted to the challenges posed by the project itself. In the case of Bo01, one of the new aspects was the establishment of Bo01AB, which was set up to ensure that the exhibition was ready in time and that its standards and aims were met. This agency included only public actors; it led the process of organizing the exhibition and was a key consultant in the urban development project itself (Interviews Reepalu, Blucher) . Bo01AB consisted of people who shared a planning background or interest. This is probably one of the reasons why the layout proposed for the area was different from what was the standard at the time for city planning in Malmö and in Sweden. This was only possible due to the particular momentum created by the housing exhibition, as well as the interest of developers in working in such a high visibility project and in trying to recover from a string of bad years for the housing market, and because those involved shared a common language -that of planning and urban development (Interviews Larsson, Rosberg, Blucher) .
The existence of a core project group in Bo01 ensured that the goals of the housing exhibition were met and that there were no divided loyalties. However, from the side of the municipality, the organizational setup was more complicated, with the heads of the main departments involved having to decide together on issues related to Bo01 and the municipality. This meant that sometimes the politicians were called in to make a decision, or that the issue had to be extensively debated until a consensus was reached. This absence of a clear leader making decisions from the municipal side was highlighted as a problem (Interview Dalman).
For Brunnshög, the organizational setting was different. Learning from the experience of Bo01, but also from other projects, there was a core project group set up within the municipality, led by Dalman, who is the ultimate decision maker within the group and is also part of the steering committee where politicians are involved. The project group sits in a common office in a different building from the rest of the municipality. There are no divided loyalties, and it makes informal meetings and conversations easier (Interviews Dalman, Abrahamsson). However, it does have the disadvantage that Brunnshög appears disconnected from other planning projects happening in Lund as there is a single project team, as opposed to different people involved in various projects simultaneously. Additionally, interaction between projects and sharing experiences becomes harder (Interview Abrahamsson).
For the Bo01 project, the developers were grouped in a developer's group, led by the head of planning department. This meant the group of private interests and investors had a voice in project organization, as represented by a public officer and planner. The idea came from the mayor. Until recently, the head of the planning department had worked in the private sector and had good connections with the developers. This was considered an advantage in a time when the housing market was insecure and developers were hesitant about being involved in high risk projects (Interview Reepalu). These were also the reasons why developers were invited to join in the early stages of the project (Interview Dalman).
In Brunnshög, developers are not yet cooperating as a group of similar interests, although the project group has already approached them to form a single group and discuss among themselves (Interview Flycht). However, the planning process is still in its beginning stages, with no detailed plan approved. Additionally, there are reservations regarding the economic viability of investing in Brunnshög, which makes developers hesitant to commit when it comes to dates and standards for development. What is clear is that the involvement of developers so far has been standardthey have been kept informed of the status and development of the project but have not been involved in the design of the project (Interview Flycht).
At Bo01 the Quality Program was developed as a tool to secure the environmental standards for the housing and the public areas and the compliance of developers. Quality programs are not new to the municipality. Although the Quality Program was a responsibility of the Planning Department, the developers and Bo01AB were also involved, together with other external consultants. The Quality Program was included as a compromise in the land-allocation contracts and functioned as a concrete guideline for the sustainability vision for Bo01. It was concluded that those developers that had been actively involved in the definition of the quality program were also more aware of its importance as a safeguard of environmental standards and regulations, an assurance that their competitors, other developers, were also subject to the same standards (Persson, 2005) .
The perspective that Brunnshög is being developed for researchers and highly educated people is not shared by the project group, although they recognize that there is a special attention placed on how this group might use the neighborhood (Interviews Dalman, Abrahamsson). For the developers, however, it is the presence of the research facilities, and consequently the type of users that might use the neighborhood -researchers, students, university people -that brings the special character to the area. This is the unknown card that for developers, if well exploited, will contribute to the attractiveness of Brunnshög as a district to invest in. The emphasis on sustainability is important, but what is truly innovative with Brunnshög is not the sustainability emphasis, as was the case in Bo01, but the closeness to the ESS and MaxIV (Interview Flycht).
Conclusions
This paper started from a premise that has been widespread in literature that there is a "turn" in urban policy towards entrepreneurial urban governance, framing the conditions in which physical planning occurs. The paper first asked how this "turn" influenced how physical planning occurs nowadays.
The "turn" was discussed as potentially meaning greater fragmentation and decentralization in the urban governance context. This meant fragmentation in the approaches taken and the geographical location of planning projects throughout the city, as a result of the temporary constellation of private and public stakeholders coming together. It also meant a potential turn towards projects with fragmented visions and objectives for urban development and the city, set up in partnerships that were temporary and potentially plagued by competing objectives. Decentralization would be visible in the delegation of tasks traditionally held by the municipality to other levels of government, as well as in the involvement of private stakeholders and areabased agencies in the design and implementation of projects.
Regarding the cases discussed here, one could argue that there is not a turn towards decentralized contexts for urban governance influencing physical planning practice. Instead we can observe the coexistence of instances of centralization and decentralization. Centralization is visible in the role played by the planning department and the municipality: being the backbone of the LSUDPs, getting them off the ground, collecting the necessary partners for the LSUDPs to come through, and driving the process of defining the goals and standards for the LSUDPs. Decentralization is visible when other stakeholders are invited to participate at the early stages of designing the project, and in the existence of an area-based agency for Bo01. What has changed is the importance given to profitability criteria, i.e. what the market expects from the development. In that sense, one could say that it is not the developers who are taking over the projects, but the expected market needs and demands which are taking them over, a situation distinct from the market-sheltered context provided by the housing policy until the early 1990s.
In Sweden, the public sector has traditionally held a monopoly over physical planning, so it would be expected that this role remains strong nowadays, despite being changed by financial constraints at the municipal level that push physical planning to think about return-oninvestment issues and on how best to ensure that there are indeed investors for housing developments. Physical planning is essential as a middleman between developers. Developers are competitors amongst themselves. Physical planning is expected to lay concrete rules and standards that developers have to follow and visions for the district, and to ensure that everyone involved keeps up with their end of the bargain -i.e., to create a level playing field.
Thus, the context for physical planning practice has changed since the 1970s, but the change does not reflect a dramatic turn in urban policy; it reflects instead a sequence of changes within the broader context for planning practice (Orrskog & Bradley, 2006) .
The paper then asked how physical planning is adapting to this changing context. Fragmentation marked the challenges and influenced the adaptation measures that physical planning adopted in each of the LSUDPs. Experimentation and inter-project learning stood out as two of the adaptation strategies. The difficulties of collaborating in a public-private partnership with competing ambitions, goals and standards was addressed by opening up the planning process to the involved stakeholders from a very early stage. One could also understand this as a move from the planning department to try to maintain control of the process. By inviting interested stakeholders at an early stage, the planning department can take control of the agenda for discussion, step in early with proposals and visions and take the role of a mediator in the newlyformed partnership.
Experimenting with the sustainability discourse could also be seen as a way for physical planning to push forward ideals regarding "good urban form", for example, by arguing for a denser city scape in the new neighborhoods with mixed usage and smaller plots that gave priority to pedestrian and slow traffic. The sustainability discourse is particularly interesting as it encloses a paradox. On the one hand, studies have shown that in the implementation of sustainability strategies, broad community involvement is essential to guarantee the success of the strategy. On the other hand, the LSUDPs in discussion here exclude the wider community, using the justification that there was no one actually living in the neighborhood prior to the urban development (Bo01) or by arguing that the inclusion of inhabitants would add too much confusion to the organization of the project (Brunnshög). Nevertheless, sustainability opens up an opportunity for developers to see a business opportunity (especially in Bo01), it offers a backbone against which to try informal or unregulated approaches to citizens' involvement (Brunnshög), and it can be what grants a holistic perspective to development and maintains the perspective of what is the "public good", a cornerstone in the practice of Swedish physical planning.
The paper thus illustrates that, at least in Sweden, the claims of an entrepreneurial turn in urban policy can be understood as the reflection of a wider context that is changing: the dismantling of the housing policy; the opening up of the housing sector to market forces; the increasing heterogeneous and multicultural character of Swedish society, where it is now increasingly difficult to plan for "one size fits all" as was common until the 1970s (Orrskog & Bradley, 2006) ; and the changes in the responsibilities of the municipalities regarding welfare delivery and local economic promotion. Physical planning captures how this turn is yet unfolding, by adopting adaptation practices that function as a bridge between the challenges placed by the changing context and the established practices of before.
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